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I. INTRODUCTION† 
Parents have a “fundamental right to make decisions concerning the 
care, custody, and control of [their children].”1 However, more than three 
million parents are subject to child protection investigations every year in 
the United States.2 Approximately 700 to 800 children are removed from 
their homes daily, according to the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services.3 Removal of the child from the home is, in many cases, 
where the child protection process begins for parents and families and 
when the permanency-timeline clock starts ticking.4 Once the court has 
jurisdiction over the child, parents must correct the conditions that led to 
the out-of-home placement within a specified period. Sometimes parents 
 
†   Thank you to Natalie Netzel for her help in finding this topic, her support 
through the writing process, and her guidance as I learn to navigate the child protection 
system as a parent advocate.   
 1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000).  
 2. Rachel Blustain, Defending the Family: The Need for Legal Representation in 
Child-Welfare Proceedings, THE NATION (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/defending-the-family-the-need-for-legal-representation-in-
child-welfare-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/2Q6L-XX67]. 
 3. Paul Chill, Hundreds of U.S. Children Taken from Home, HARTFORD 
COURANT (June 25, 2018), http://www.courant.com/opinion/op-ed/hc-op-chill-removing-
children-20180625-story.html [https://perma.cc/JV86-SZES]. 
 4. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & VIVEK S. SANKARAN, REPRESENTING PARENTS IN 
CHILD WELFARE CASES, ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY DEFENDERS, 2 (2015) 
(explaining that states are encouraged or required to file a petition to terminate parental 
rights after a child has been in foster care for a specified amount of time); Ann Ahlstrom, 
CHIPS to Permanency Timeline: Required Timing for Permanency Proceedings under 
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 260C except CHIPS by-pass Cases and Voluntary 
Placements, CHILDREN’S JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Feb. 2015), http://www.mncourts.gov/mnco
urtsgov/media/scao_library/CJI/CHIPS_TO_Permanency_Timeline_Chart_(February_20
15)_(Ahlstrom).pdf [https://perma.cc/8RWD-8NPX] (outlining the required timing for 
permanency proceedings in Minnesota).  
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have as little as three to six months5—or up to twelve months in 
Minnesota6— to correct the conditions before regaining full custody and 
control of their children. Parents not only work against the clock in child 
protection matters, but they also confront procedural issues throughout 
the proceedings that create barriers to the fundamentally fair procedures 
to which they are entitled. This is because child protection proceedings 
function differently than proceedings in a more traditional legal case.7 For 
instance, once a court determines a child needs protection or services, the 
court must then oversee the process and efforts of the social services 
agency8 as that agency works toward permanency for the child and the 
family.9  A number of decisions made between the initial adjudication and 
the final permanency order have the potential to affect the outcome of the 
case and substantially affect a parent’s rights.10  
Other legal scholars have examined various issues within the child 
protection system and looked broadly at those problem areas. This note 
will explore Minnesota’s procedures throughout child protection 
proceedings that cut away at the due process rights of parents. First, this 
note will lay the backdrop by exploring the constitutional rights of parents 
in the upbringing of their children. Second, this note will cover the 
concepts of due process and fundamental fairness as they apply to parents 
involved in the child protection system. Third, this note will discuss 
various procedural barriers in Minnesota that diminish fundamental 
fairness for parents and erode parents’ due process rights. These 
procedural barriers include the lack of representation for parents in child 
 
 5. GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 2.   
 6. MINN. STAT. § 260C.505(a) (2016) (“A permanency or termination of parental 
rights petition must be filed at or prior to the time the child has been in foster care or in the 
care of a noncustodial or nonresident parent for 11 months . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 
260C.507(a) (2016) (“An admit-deny hearing on the permanency or termination of 
parental rights petition shall be held not later than 12 months from the child’s placement in 
foster care or an order for the child to be in the care of a noncustodial or nonresident 
parent.”); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 4.03, subdiv. 2(b) (“[T]he court shall commence 
permanent placement determination proceedings to determine the permanent status of the 
child not later than twelve (12) months after the child is placed in foster care or in the 
home of a noncustodial or nonresident parent.”).  
 7. Alicia LeVezu, The Illusion of Appellate Review in Dependency Proceedings, 68 
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 83, 2 (2017).  
 8. MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 27a (2017) (“‘Responsible social services 
agency’ means the county social services agency that has responsibility for public child 
welfare and child protection services and includes the provision of adoption services as an 
agent of the commissioner of human services.”). 
 9. LeVezu, supra note 7, at 2. 
 10. See infra Parts IV, V.  
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welfare proceedings, issues with the removal of children from their 
parents, the inability to appeal certain orders throughout the proceedings, 
the lack of repercussions for child welfare agencies when they fail to 
perform their statutory obligations, and issues with involuntary termination 
and the presumption of palpable unfitness. Fourth, and finally, this note 
will explore the tension between the best interests of the child and the 
rights of the parents.  
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  
A. Substantive Due Process: Parenting as a Fundamental Right 
The right of parents to control the care and upbringing of their 
children is a fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution.11 In its 
1923 decision Meyer v. Nebraska,12 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
statute forbidding the teaching of any language except English to 
schoolchildren was unconstitutional because it interfered with an 
individual’s right to “establish a home and bring up children.”13 Then, in 
1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,14 the Court found the Oregon 
Compulsory Education Act, which required attendance at public schools, 
unconstitutional.15 The Court found that “the Act of 1922 unreasonably 
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control.”16 Furthermore, 
the Court held that “rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be 
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the state.”17 
Later, in Troxel v. Granville,18 pursuant to a state statute permitting 
any person to petition the court for visitation rights, a state court granted 
visitation to the paternal grandparents of two children, despite the 
mother’s opposition to the amount of visitation the grandparents 
requested.19 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the parents’ determination 
 
 11. Vivek S. Sankaran, Moving Beyond Lassiter: The Need for a Federal Statutory 
Right to Counsel for Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 44 J. LEGIS. 1 (2017); GUGGENHEIM 
& SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 6.  
 12. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
 13. Id. at 399.  
 14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  
 15. Id. at 534.  
 16. Id. at 534–35.  
 17. Id. at 535.  
 18. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).  
 19. Id. at 57.  
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of their child’s best interests must be given weight.20 The Court asserted 
that:  
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children 
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the state to inject 
itself into the private realm of the family to further question the 
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the 
rearing of that parent’s children.21 
Thus, Troxel reaffirmed that parents have a fundamental right to 
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment22 by holding 
that the statute “unconstitutionally infringe[d] on that fundamental parental 
right.”23 In addition to substantive rights, parents also have procedural 
protections when the parent-child relationship is at stake.  
B. Procedural Due Process and Fundamentally Fair Procedures 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”24 Due process has not been, nor will it likely ever be, 
precisely defined. Rather, “[a]pplying the Due Process Clause is . . . an 
uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ 
consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant 
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.”25 
When considering what process is due, there are three elements that must 
be analyzed: (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the government’s interests, 
and (3) the risk that the procedures used will lead to an erroneous 
decision.26 In the context of the parent-child relationship, due process 
analysis begins with the premise that a parent’s right to “the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” is 
a significant interest that “warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection.”27 This interest must be balanced 
against the state’s interest in the welfare of the child.28 Finally, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of the right to parent must be considered in 
 
 20. Id. at 67. 
 21. Id. at 68–69.  
 22. Id. at 66.  
 23. Id. at 67.  
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 25. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981).  
 26. Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).  
 27. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
 28. Id.  
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assessing the procedural protections afforded to the parent.29 It is “not 
disputed that state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a 
parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the 
requisites of the Due Process Clause.”30  
In Stanley v. Illinois,31 pursuant to an Illinois law, an unwed father’s 
children were declared wards of the state without a finding of unfitness 
when the children’s mother died. The Court found that as “a matter of 
due process of law,” the father was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a 
parent before his children were taken away from him.32 Accordingly, 
Stanley stands for the proposition that parents must be afforded due 
process in matters where the state seeks to dissolve their fundamental right 
to parent. As a component of due process, parents are entitled to 
“fundamentally fair procedures.”33  
C. Santosky v. Kramer: Fundamental Fairness  
In Santosky v. Kramer,34 the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide 
whether a New York law, which required only “a fair preponderance of 
the evidence” to support a termination of parental rights, was a rigorous 
enough standard in the face of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.35 The Court held that “the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment demands more . . . . Before a state may sever 
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due 
process requires that the state support its allegations by at least clear and 
convincing evidence.”36 The Court explained that:  
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate 
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost 
temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood 
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in 
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If 
anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental 
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than 
do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. 
 
 29. Id. at 28.  
 30. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37).  
 31. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
 32. Id. at 649.  
 33. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755. 
 34. Id. at 745.  
 35. Id. at 747–48.  
 36. Id. at 747–48.  
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When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it 
must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.37 
Accordingly, under Santosky, parents are entitled to fundamentally 
fair proceedings.38 However, notwithstanding the Court’s Santosky holding, 
parents are not necessarily entitled to representation.  
D. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services: No Right to Counsel  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Services39 established that indigent parents do not have a right to 
appointed counsel in parental termination proceedings under the 
Constitution.40 The Court noted that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is 
an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a 
powerful countervailing interest, protection.’”41 Nonetheless, the Court 
held that the appointment of counsel in every parental termination 
proceeding is not constitutionally required.42 Therefore, individual 
legislatures and courts determine whether a parent will receive counsel and 
at what point in the proceedings counsel will be appointed.43 This leads to 
variation in how and when counsel is appointed to parents across the 
states. Some states require the appointment of counsel before the removal 
of a child from her parents.44 Other states do not appoint counsel until the 
parents’ rights are being terminated.45 But perhaps most troubling of all, 
some states allow a termination to be finalized without ever appointing 
counsel.46  
In Minnesota, a parent receives representation only if the court 
determines that “such an appointment is appropriate.”47 The discretionary 
nature of Minnesota’s statute, backed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lassiter, means Minnesota parents may not be appointed 
counsel when their constitutional right to the control and custody of their 
 
 37. Id. at 753–54. 
 38. Id.  
 39. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 27 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Sankaran, supra note 11, at 2.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3) (2016).  
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children is at stake. Recently, there have been efforts to reform and clarify 
this law through appellate advocacy.  
E. The Non-Party Parent’s Right to Representation in Minnesota 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in its 2018 decision In re Welfare 
of the Child of A.M.C. and G.J.F.,48 re-established that parents in 
Minnesota do not have a federal or state constitutional due process right to 
appointed counsel in a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) 
case. The court, however, clarified whether a non-party parent in a CHIPS 
case is afforded the right to court-appointed counsel.49  
Specifically, G.J.F.—the adjudicated father of N.F., who was 
adjudicated a child in need of protection or services—attended the 
admit/deny hearing in the CHIPS case and requested court-appointed 
counsel.50 At that time, the district court denied the father’s request 
because he was not a custodial parent and was not a party to the 
proceedings.51 The district court also denied the father’s request to 
become a party to the proceedings.52 The father did not receive court-
-appointed counsel until the county filed a petition seeking termination of 
parental rights of both parents in August 2017.53 The father received court-
appointed counsel for the termination proceedings and his parental rights 
were subsequently terminated.54 On appeal, the court considered whether 
the father was entitled to reversal of the termination of his parental rights 
because of the district court’s failure to appoint counsel for him in the 
CHIPS case.55 
The court of appeals held that the district court erred when it “based 
its denial of appointed counsel for the father on the fact that the father was 
not a party to the CHIPS case.”56 The court reasoned that section 
260C.163, subdivisions 3(a)–(g) of the Minnesota Statutes provide that 
“[t]he child, parent, guardian or custodian has the right to effective 
assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court as 
provided in this subdivision.”57 Under Chapter 260C, a parent is defined 
 
 48. 920 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
 49. Id. at 648. 
 50. Id. at 653. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 654.  
 56. Id. at 659.  
 57. Id. (emphasis added).  
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as “a person who has a legal parent and child relationship with a child 
which confers or imposes on the person legal rights, privileges, duties, and 
obligations.”58 In this case, because he was the adjudicated father of N.F., 
the father was legally recognized as the child’s parent under Minnesota 
law.59  
Because the district court denied the father’s request for appointed 
counsel given his nonparty status, the court of appeals explained that the 
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure distinguished between 
parties and participants.60 Specifically, the court noted that under the rules, 
a noncustodial parent, such as a father, is a participant unless the parent 
successfully intervenes under Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection 
Procedure 23.61 However, the court explained that section 260C.163 of the 
Minnesota Statutes and Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure 
25 make no distinction between parents who are parties and parents who 
are participants regarding the appointment of counsel.62 Instead, the statute 
allows the district court to appoint counsel to an indigent parent when the 
court “feels that such an appointment is appropriate.”63 Under this 
reasoning, the court concluded that the father, as an adjudicated parent of 
N.F., should not have been denied court-appointed counsel simply 
because he was a participant rather than a party to the proceedings.64 
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the district court abused its 
discretion because it misapplied the law.65 The court, however, did not 
ultimately reverse the termination of the father’s parental rights, noting 
that:  
[T]he district court could have declined to appoint counsel for 
father in the CHIPS case had it felt, as it seems it may have felt, 
that appointment of counsel would be inappropriate for a parent 
who is repeatedly incarcerated, unavailable to care for the child, 
and marginally interested in working a case plan.66 
Despite the fact that the court did not reverse the father’s termination 
of parental rights, the court did clarify that all parents, regardless of their 
party status, are entitled to representation where the court finds that 
 
 58. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 25 (2016)). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 660.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 659 (citing MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 3(c) (2016)).  
 64. Id. at 660.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 660–61.  
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representation is appropriate.67 While the court afforded parents slightly 
greater protection regarding appointment to counsel, it nonetheless did 
not alter the discretionary nature of Minnesota’s appointment-of-counsel 
statute. Consequently, under Minnesota law, parents may still not be 
afforded counsel when their parental rights are at stake.  
Parents must contend with several other procedural barriers beyond 
the possible lack of representation that threaten the fundamentally fair 
procedures to which they are entitled.  
III.  REMOVAL UNDER MINNESOTA LAW 
“Perhaps the most important court decision made at the outset of a 
child protection case is whether to remove a child from his or her home 
or whether to approve a removal if one has been made extrajudicially.”68 
Under Minnesota law, child protective services (CPS) can remove a child 
from their home before going to court under certain circumstances.69 The 
circumstances under which a child can be removed from her parents 
without judicial approval depend on the statutory language governing CPS’ 
operation. The issue is whether the statutory language that permits CPS to 
remove a child without judicial approval is specific or open-ended-.70  
In contrast to state statutes that require “immediate danger”71 to the 
child to justify removal without a court order, Minnesota’s removal statute 
broadly states that a child can be taken into custody without a court order 
“when [the] child is found in surroundings or conditions which endanger 
the child’s health or welfare or which such peace officer reasonably 
believes will endanger the child’s health or welfare.”72 This broad language 
may be partially why Minnesota removes children from their homes at the 
sixth highest rate in the country.73 Beyond the fact that studies have shown 
 
 67. Id.  
 68. GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 33.  
 69. Id. at 34.  
 70. See id.  
 71. See id. (discussing state statutes that require the risk of “imminent” or 
“immediate” harm to child to justify removal without a court order).  
 72. MINN. STAT. § 260C.175, subdiv. 1(2)(ii) (2016) (emphasis added). See also 
GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34 (“In many states, however, statutes that 
authorize police officers and child protective caseworkers to take children into protective 
custody without prior judicial approval contain considerably more open-ended language. 
For example, Oregon merely requires a caseworker’s conclusion that ‘the child’s condition 
or surroundings reasonably appear to be such as to jeopardize the child’s welfare.’”).  
 73. Richard Wexler, Minnesota’s Approach to Child Protection Makes Children 
Less Safe, MINNPOST (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/community-
10
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that children who are left in their homes fare better than those children 
placed in foster care74—which is reason enough to reconsider the statutory 
language—there may be constitutional due process issues for parents when 
their children are removed from their care without a court order.75  
A. Case Study: Whisman v. Rinehart  
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 
Whisman v. Rinehart76 illustrates the constitutional issues at stake.77 Joel 
Whisman, the sixteen-month---old son of Michelle Whisman, was 
removed from his mother’s care and placed in a shelter because she had 
not picked him up from the babysitter at the agreed-upon time, alongside 
reports from Michelle’s boyfriend that she was “passed out drunk” at 
home.78 Joel was placed in a shelter despite that the babysitter had 
arranged for his grandmother to pick him up.79 There was no court-
ordered hold until thirteen days after Joel was taken into custody, and 
Michelle was not afforded a due-process hearing until Joel had been in 
custody for seventeen days.80 Moreover, the social services agency failed to 
investigate whether it was necessary to take Joel in the absence of physical 
neglect indicators, no immediate threat to his well-being, and no indication 
that Michelle was involved in any criminal activity.81  
Michelle Whisman brought suit against the juvenile officers and 
social workers, claiming that they violated her constitutional right to 
familial association and denied her the right to the due process of law.82 
The court held that Michelle had an established right to the custody of 
Joel, that Joel had a corresponding right to familial association with his 
mother, and that the defendants violated these rights.83 The court further 
held that even if the defendants had the right to take custody of Joel, they 




 74. Id.  
 75. See GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34–36.  
 76. See id. at 36 (“[A] parent’s remedy for a constitutionally illegal seizure of one’s 
child is limited to a damages action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014).”). 
 77. 119 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997).  
 78. Id. at 1307.  
 79. Id. at 1310.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1307.  
 83. Id. at 1310. 
 84. Id.  
11
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This case not only illustrates the dangers associated with a lack of oversight 
of the decisions made by juvenile officers and social workers but also 
demonstrates the ease with which parents’ rights may be violated.  
B. K.D. v. County of Crow Wing and Minnesota’s Removal Statute 
In contrast to the Whisman example, the court in K.D. v. County of 
Crow Wing found that a mother’s constitutional rights were not infringed 
when her seven-year-old son was placed under a seventy-two-hour 
protective hold.85 The police had previously investigated the mother after 
reports that she was involved in narcotics trafficking.86 When the mother 
went to the law enforcement center with her son to retrieve her vehicle 
after the police had seized it, her son was placed in a protective hold.87 The 
officers later testified that they believed the mother had been under the 
influence of drugs when she reported to the law enforcement center; 
however, neither of the incident reports prepared by the officers indicated 
their belief that she was under the influence at the time of the child’s 
removal.88 The mother alleged violations of the Due Process Clause and 
violations of the Fourth Amendment.89  
In its analysis, the court examined section 260C.175 of the Minnesota 
Statutes and concluded that the defendants did not violate the mother’s 
constitutional rights when they temporarily removed the child pursuant to 
the statute because, based on the circumstances, the removal was proper.90 
The court explained that: 
The circumstances under which a child can be removed from 
his or her parents’ custody without a court order are extremely 
limited . . . . Minnesota Statutes § 260C.175 . . . provides that a 
child may be taken into immediate custody by a peace officer 
“when a child is found in surroundings or conditions which 
endanger the child’s health or welfare or which such peace 
officer reasonably believes will endanger the child’s health or 
welfare.”91  
The court’s assertion that the statute provides extremely limited 
circumstances under which a child can be removed without a court order 
is flawed. Under the statute, a police officer may remove a child as long as 
 
 85. 434 F.3d 1051, 1058 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 86. Id. at 1053.  
 87. Id. at 1054.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 1056.  
 91. Id. (emphasis added).  
12
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 10
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss2/10
  
696 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2 
he merely “reasonably believes” that the child’s health or welfare is 
threatened.92  
Furthermore, Minnesota law does not contemplate removal only 
where there is the risk of immediate or imminent harm as other states’ 
statutes do.93 The Minnesota statute’s subjective nature leaves the door 
open to situations in which a child may be removed without judicial 
approval. The court’s view that this statutory language limits the 
circumstances under which a child may be removed implies that courts are 
likely to approve a majority of non-court-ordered removals in Minnesota. 
This is because—under the court’s interpretation—removals not ordered by 
a court are understood to be the exception rather than the rule.  
C. A Comparison with Other States’ Removal Statutes 
This flawed interpretation is especially apparent when contrasted with 
other state statutes that limit the circumstances under which a child may be 
removed without judicial approval.94 For instance, in Arizona, “exigent 
circumstances” must exist to place a child into protective custody without a 
court order.95 Under Arizona’s statute, “exigent circumstances” means: 
[T]here is probable cause to believe that the child is likely to 
suffer serious harm in the time it would take to obtain a court 
order for removal and either of the following is true: 1. There is 
no less intrusive alternative to taking temporary custody of the 
child that would reasonably and sufficiently protect the child’s 
health or safety. 2. Probable cause exists to believe that the child 
is a victim of sexual abuse or abuse involving serious physical 
injury that can be diagnosed only by a physician . . . or health 
care provider . . . and who has specific training in evaluations of 
child abuse.96 
The statutes of West Virginia,97 Iowa,98 New Jersey,99 Washington,100 
and Missouri all have similar requirements.101 In addition to the 
 
 92. MINN. STAT. § 260C.127 (2016).  
 93. See id.; see also GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34.  
 94. See GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34.  
 95. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-821 (2018).   
 96. Id.  
 97. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-303 (West 2019) (“a child protective service worker 
may take the child or children into his or her custody (also known as removing the child) 
without a court order when: (1) In the presence of a child protective service worker a child 
or children are in an emergency situation which constitutes an imminent danger . . . (2) 
The worker has probable cause to believe that the child or children will suffer additional 
child abuse or neglect or will be removed from the county before a petition can be filed 
and temporary custody can be ordered.”).  
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requirements of “no time to obtain a temporary order” and “immediate 
danger” to the child, Texas’ removal statute requires that any information 
furnished by another be “corroborated by personal knowledge of facts.”102 
Even in states where there is no time limitation requirement for action in 
the absence of a court order, other statutes still restrict instances where a 
child may be removed from the home. For example, Colorado’s statute 
provides that a child may be taken into temporary custody without a court 
order where “[a]n emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered . . . 
whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and 
there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the 
child from the child’s home.”103 
Thus, while the Eighth Circuit asserted Minnesota’s statute only 
allows children to be removed without a court order in “extremely limited” 
circumstances, closer scrutiny shows this is not the case. Accordingly, the 
subjective and open-ended nature of Minnesota’s statute, along with the 
 
 98. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.79 (West 2019) (“A peace officer or juvenile court 
officer may take a child into custody, a physician treating a child may keep the child in 
custody, or a juvenile court officer may authorize a peace officer, physician, or medical 
security personnel to take a child into custody, without a court order as required under 
section 232.78 and without the consent of a parent, guardian, or custodian provided that 
both of the following apply: a. The child is in a circumstance or condition that presents an 
imminent danger to the child’s life or health. b) There is not enough time to apply for an 
order under section 232.78.”).   
 99. N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:6-8.29 (West 2019) (“A police officer or designated employee 
. . . may remove a child from the place where the child is residing, or any person or any 
physician treating a child may keep a child in the person’s or physician’s custody without an 
order . . . and without the consent of the parent or guardian . . . if the child is in such 
condition that the child’s continuance in the place or residence or in the care and custody 
of the parent or guardian presents an imminent danger to the child’s life, safety, or health, 
and there is insufficient time to apply for a court order . . . .”).   
 100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (West 2018) (“A law enforcement officer 
may take, or cause to be taken, a child into custody without a court order if there is 
probable cause to believe that the child is abused or neglected and that the child would be 
injured or could not be taken into custody if it were necessary to first obtain a court order . 
. . .”).  
 101. MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.125 (West 2018) (“A police officer, law enforcement 
official, or a physician who has reasonable cause to believe that a child is in imminent 
danger of suffering serious physical harm or a threat to life as a result of abuse or neglect 
and such person has reasonable cause to believe the harm or threat to life may occur 
before a juvenile court could issue a temporary protective custody order . . . the police 
officer, law enforcement official or physician may take or retain temporary protective 
custody of the child without the consent of the child’s parents, guardian or others legally 
responsible for his care.”); GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34.  
 102. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 262.104 (West 2017). 
 103. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-401 (West 2018).  
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court’s interpretation that the statute only allows for limited removals, 
places Minnesota parents at a greater risk of having their children 
wrongfully removed from their care, in violation of their substantive and 
procedural due process rights.  
IV. ISSUES THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS 
Child protection cases begin and end with the typical due process 
procedures that attorneys understand and expect.104 These cases begin 
when the government formally charges a parent with abuse or neglect of a 
child.105 The government then has the burden of proving that the 
individual charged is an unfit parent, which results in the custody of the 
child being transferred to the governmental agency.106 Similarly, at the end 
of the proceedings, there is typically a permanency trial, where the state 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has not 
corrected the conditions that initially led to the transfer of custody to the 
governmental agency.107 However, some of Minnesota’s statutes and rules 
that guide practices between these two bookends may not be 
fundamentally fair and may undermine a parent’s due process rights.108  
A. Out-of-Home Placement Plans  
State laws require that the responsible social services agency make 
reasonable efforts to provide services to the family to remedy the issues 
 
 104. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect 
Cases between Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 14–15 (2010).  
 105. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 260C.141, subdiv. 1 (2016) (stating that any “reputable 
person” having knowledge that a child is in need of protection or services may petition the 
juvenile court, and outlining the information a petition must contain, including, but not 
limited to, a statement of facts that would establish there is a need for protection or 
services).  
 106. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 15–16; see MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, sudiv. 1(a) 
(2016) (“To be proved at trial, allegations of a petition alleging a child to be in need of 
protection or services must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 107. Id. at 16; see generally MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 1(a) (2016) (“To be 
proved at trial, allegations of a petition alleging a child to be in need of protection or 
services must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, 
subdiv. 1(5) (2016) (stating that the juvenile court may terminate all rights of a parent to a 
child if it finds that “following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, 
under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s 
placement.”).  
 108. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 14.  
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that led to the out-of-home placement.109 To receive federal funds for 
foster care,110 the state must provide a written case plan for each child.111 
Moreover, under federal law,112 the case plan must specify:  
A plan for ensuring that the child receives safe and proper care 
and that appropriate services are provided to the parents, child, 
and foster parents: [t]o improve the conditions in the parents’ 
home[,] [t]o facilitate the child’s return to his or her own safe 
home or the alternative permanent placement of the child[.]113  
States typically require that the case plan include goals and objectives 
that the parent must meet to create a safe home for the child, along with 
timelines in which to complete the goals and objectives.114 The agency 
must file the out-of-home placement plan with the court once the child has 
been removed from her home.115  
Under the Minnesota Statutes, “[a]n out-of-home placement plan . . . 
shall be filed with the court within 30 days of the filing of a juvenile 
protection petition . . . when the court orders emergency removal of the 
child under this section.”116 Additionally, the out-of-home-placement plan 
is to be “developed jointly with the parent and in consultation with 
others.”117 While these statutes contemplate a timeline and procedures 
(developing the plan jointly with the parent) for the agency to complete the 
 
 109. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES 
AND ACHIEVE 
PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/reunify.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4DH8-E5CT]; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 18.  
 110. Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (2013) (citing Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act § 
471(a)(16)).  
 111. Id.  
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (2018).  
 113. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CASE PLANNING FOR FAMILIES INVOLVED WITH CHILD 
WELFARE AGENCIES, 1, 3 (2018), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/caseplanning.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FE7-5272]. 
 114. Id.  
 115. See generally id. at 2 (“States . . . require a case plan when a child welfare agency 
places a child in out-of-home care, including foster care, placement with a relative, group 
homes, and residential placement.”).  
 116. MINN. STAT. § 260C.178, subdiv. 7(a) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 260C.212, subdiv. 
1(a) (2016); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 37.02, subdiv. 2. 
 117. MINN. STAT. § 260C.178, subdiv. 7(b) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 260C.212, subdiv. 
1(b) (2016).  
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out-of-home placement plan, they do not contemplate repercussions for 
the agency in the event of noncompliance.118  
Moreover, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, while examining whether 
a court’s failure to issue a termination-of-parental-rights order within the 
required fifteen days under Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection 
Procedure 39.05 and 10.01, found that the court’s failure to comply with 
the rules did not warrant a reversal or remand as the mother had argued.119 
The court of appeals asserted that Minnesota case law distinguishes 
between mandatory and directory provisions, and that where a statute 
contains a requirement, but provides no consequence for noncompliance, 
the statute is directory rather than mandatory.120 Finally, the court of 
appeals found that noncompliance with a directory provision does not 
trigger an automatic penalty.121 In this way, the court of appeals found that 
the district court’s noncompliance with the rules did not warrant a reversal 
because rules 10.01 and 39.05 do not provide a consequence for 
noncompliance. Since section 260C. 212, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota 
Statutes does not contemplate a consequence for noncompliance, courts 
are likely to consider the thirty-day timeline a directory provision, which 
means noncompliance would not trigger an automatic penalty. 
Accordingly, even though the agency’s failure undoubtedly affects the 
parents who are required to comply with the case plan in a timely manner 
if they wish to regain custody of their children, the agency will suffer no 
repercussions for failing to comply with the thirty-day timeline in the 
statute.122  
Not only must parents comply with the case plan if they wish to 
regain custody of their children, but they must make adequate progress on 
the case plan throughout the proceedings. For instance, in Minnesota, the 
 
 118. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.212 (2016) (outlining the requirements for the case 
plan).  
 119. In re Welfare of Children of S.L.K.-S., A17-1570, 2018 WL 1787969, at *4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2018).  
 120. Id. (citing Johnson v. Cook County, 786 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. 2010) and 
Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Minn. 2007)).  
 121. Id. (citing Johnson, 786 N.W.2d at 295–96).  
 122. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(5)(iii) (2016) (“[C]onditions leading to 
the out-of-home placement have not been corrected. It is presumed that conditions leading 
to a child’s out-of-home placement have not been corrected upon a showing that the parent 
or parents have not substantially complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case 
plan[.]”); MINN. STAT. § 260C.517 (outlining the required findings for a disposition order, 
including “the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use services to correct the 
conditions which led to the out-of-home placement; and that the conditions which led to 
the out-of-home placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely return 
home.”).  
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court must conduct a permanency-progress-review hearing six months 
after the case begins.123 At this hearing, the court must review the progress 
of the case and, specifically, “the parent’s progress on the case plan or out-
of-home placement plan, whichever is applicable.”124 If the court finds that 
the parent has maintained contact with the child and is complying with the 
court-ordered case plan, then the court may return the child home or 
continue the matter for up to another six months.125 However, if the court 
determines that the parent is not complying with the case plan, presumably 
measured by the parent’s progress,126 then the court may order the agency 
to develop a plan for a legally permanent placement away from the parent 
and file a permanency petition within thirty days.127 Accordingly, if the 
agency fails to file the case plan within the statutorily mandated thirty days, 
the parent is the only party who suffers the consequences at the six-month 
mark after failing to make progress. Moreover, the failure of the agency to 
file a case plan promptly also can affect the outcome of the case, as the 
parent is nevertheless held to the permanency timelines and must still 
correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement prior to the 
twelve month permanency deadline.128 Consequently, a late start on the 
case plan at the beginning of a case could mean termination of parental 
rights at the end.   
B. Reasonable Efforts to Hold the Agency Accountable? 
As noted, under federal law, state agencies are required to make 
“reasonable efforts” to rehabilitate parents who have had their children 
removed and ultimately reunify the family.129 What reasonable efforts 
entail, however, is not clearly defined in federal law.130 In Minnesota, what 
 
 123. MINN. STAT. § 260C.204 (2016). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. See id. (“(a) When a child continues in placement out of the home of the parent 
or guardian from whom the child was removed, no later than six months after the child’s 
placement the court shall conduct a permanency progress hearing to review: (1) the 
progress of the case, the parent’s progress on the case plan or out-of-home placement plan, 
whichever is applicable[.]”).  
 127. Id. 
 128. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(5)(i) (2016).  
 129. O’Brien, supra note 110, at 1030.   
 130. See id. at 1054 (stating that “[t]here is lack of a concise definition in federal statute 
or judicial opinions . . . .”); Amelia S. Watson, A New Focus on Reasonable Efforts to 
Reunify, A.B.A. (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_la
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constitutes reasonable efforts is a factual inquiry that requires the court to 
consider several factors.131 Specifically, the “court shall consider whether 
services to the child . . . were: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of 
the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) 
culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and 
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.”132 Regardless of how 
“reasonable efforts” are defined, the requirement seems intended to hold 
the agency accountable for its efforts to reunify the family, in light of the 
parents’ fundamental right to the care and custody of their child under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.133 Accordingly, the reasonable efforts 
requirement functions as a check on the agency. However, in practice, this 
requirement may not fulfill its apparent purpose.134  
Presumably, the parent may argue that the agency has failed to make 
“reasonable efforts” to create the case plan promptly when the agency 
does not meet the deadline outlined in the statute. However, even where 
the agency fails to make reasonable efforts to submit a timely case plan, 
judges are reluctant to find that no reasonable efforts were made because 
the state may lose federal aid.135 Consequently, even when agencies fail to 
make the required reasonable efforts, they do not suffer repercussions. 
Instead, parents who receive case plans more than thirty days into the case 
are the ones left with less time to remedy the conditions that led to the 




 131. See MINN. STAT. § 260.012(h)(1)–(6) (2016).  
 132. Id.  
 133. O’Brien, supra note 110, at 1030.  
 134. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 27 (“It is not surprising, therefore, that state 
courts’ implementation of federal ‘reasonable efforts’ requirements has faced criticism as 
substance-free rubber stamp decisions by state judges . . . . In the absence of a federal 
definition of the term or adequate federal funding for prevention or reunification services, 
‘judicial findings of reasonable efforts are often made by judges by rote.’”).  
 135. See generally Priscilla Martens, Reasonable Efforts Revived, INTENSIVE FAM. 
PRES. SERVS., (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.intensivefamilypreservation.org/reasonable-efforts-
revived/ [https://perma.cc/6V5B-V5LB] (“In a revealing survey conducted in Michigan in 
2005, 20% of judges reported they always found reasonable efforts had been made, 70% 
said they rarely concluded there were no reasonable efforts, and 40% admitted that they 
lied about reasonable efforts being made because the state would otherwise lose federal 
aid! A nationwide survey of over 1,200 juvenile court judges found that only 44 judges had 
ever made at least one no reasonable efforts finding.”); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 106, at 27 
(“One study of 463 New York City cases involving children who had been in foster care for 
at least two years, and thus lacked legal permanency for a significant period of time, 
revealed that judges found that the government had made reasonable efforts to reach 
permanency in 457 cases.”).  
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C. Social Services Agency Court Reports  
Similarly, under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection 
Procedure,136 the responsible social services agency “shall submit periodic 
certified reports to the court regarding the child and family.”137 These 
reports must be filed with the court and served upon all parties at least five 
days before the hearing at which the report will be considered.138 
Additionally, the report may be supplemented at or before the hearing, 
orally or in writing.139 This rule implicates two issues that affect 
fundamental fairness for parents. First, the content of these reports is 
critical to the court’s decisions, even if the reliability of the report may be 
questionable. Second, this rule specifies that all reports be filed with the 
court and served upon the parties at least five business days before the 
hearing. Similar to the issue regarding the timeline for the filing of the out-
of-home placement plan discussed previously,140 there are seemingly no 
repercussions contemplated in the rule for when the agency fails to file the 
report by the given deadline.  
1. Content of Reports 
Agency reports must contain not only demographic information 
pertinent to the case but also must “identify progress made on the out-of-
home placement plan or case plan; . . . address the safety, permanency, 
and well-being of the child . . . ; and . . . request orders related to . . . the 
child’s need for protection or services.”141 Thus, these reports offer critical 
information on which the court relies. As such, it is important to take a 
closer look at the sources of this information and their reliability.  
The rule states that “[e]ach report shall include a statement certifying 
the content as true based upon personal observation, first-hand 
knowledge, or information and belief.”142 While each report must include 
a statement of veracity, the reports must be based merely on “personal 
observation, first-hand knowledge, or information and belief.”143 
Consequently, these reports are nothing more than the subjective 
observations and beliefs of agency workers who need to do nothing more 
 
 136. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 38.  
 137. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 38.01, subdiv. 1.  
 138. Id. at subdiv. 2.  
 139. Id. at subdiv. 3.  
 140. See supra Section IV.A.  
 141. Id. at subdiv. 5.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
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than believe the truth of their statements. This information is then 
communicated to the court. The court, in turn, relies on this information 
in making significant decisions about the lives of children and families, as 
well as the trajectory of the case.144 Additionally, parents may not be 
afforded the opportunity to rebut this information when the reports are 
filed late.  
2. A Parent’s Right to Rebuttal  
While Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure 38 
explicitly states that the agency shall file and serve the report at least five 
business days before the hearing, the rule itself does not include any 
language regarding the consequences for a failure to submit the reports 
within the designated time.145 Thus, similar to the timing requirement 
pertaining to case plans, the timing requirement for reports is likely a 
directory provision rather than mandatory.  Accordingly, noncompliance 
would not trigger a consequence for the agency.146 However, lack of 
compliance with the timing requirement by the agency affects a parent’s 
right to be heard.  
3.  A Parent’s Right to Be Heard 
One firmly established element of procedural due process is the 
opportunity to be heard.147 Minnesota law confers on parents the right to 
participate148 and be heard in the proceedings: “A parent with a legally 
recognized parent and child relationship must be provided the right to be 
heard in any review or hearing held with respect to the child, which 
includes the right to be heard on the disposition order . . . ,149 parental 
visitation . . . ,150 and the out-of-home placement plan.”151 While section 
 
 144. See generally Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 22–25, 28 (including Minnesota in 
a list of states that do not provide statutory guidance regarding whether courts should 
receive contested evidence at hearings).  
 145. Id.  
 146. See infra Section IV.A.  
 147. United States Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (“Due 
process requires notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.’”). 
 148. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 2(b) (2016). 
 149. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 260C.201, subdiv. 1 (2016). 
 150. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 2(b) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 260C.178 (2016). 
 151. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 2(b) (2016) (referring to MINN. STAT. § 
260C.212, subdiv. 1).  
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260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes ostensibly allows parents to participate 
in all proceedings, including “any review or hearing held with respect to 
the child,”152 when the agency fails to submit its reports on time, the 
parents’ opportunity to be heard is eroded. 
 The timing requirement in this rule was presumably included to 
allow parents or their counsel to effectively prepare for the hearing by 
reviewing the report, identifying any inaccuracies, and taking the necessary 
steps to correct or counter those inaccuracies. Under Minnesota Rules of 
Juvenile Protection Procedure 38.10, “[a] party may object to the content 
or recommendations of the responsible social services agency’s report by 
submitting a written objection either before or at the hearing at which the 
report is to be considered . . . . Objections . . . may also be stated on the 
record.”153 But when the agency fails to file the report within five business 
days of the hearing at which it will be considered, parents and counsel are 
left with little to prepare for the hearing and ensure that parents have a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard.  
Preparation is important because, at these hearings, the court reviews 
“whether foster care is necessary and continues to be appropriate or 
whether the child should be returned to the home of the parent or legal 
custodian from whom the child was removed.”154 Additionally, the court 
must determine, among other things, whether the agency is making 
reasonable efforts, the parents’ progress toward case plan goals, and 
whether the parent is visiting the child.155 These are all significant decisions 
that can affect the case and later permanency decisions. Furthermore, as 
explained in more detail below,156 orders from review hearings or 
intermediate-disposition hearings are not appealable since they are not 
“final” orders of the court.157 Accordingly, when parents or their attorneys 
are not provided with reports promptly before the hearing, the agency 
suffers no repercussions, but the parents likely will.158 This is especially 
true when parents are unrepresented.  
 
 152. Id.  
 153. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 38.10.  
 154. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 41.06, subdiv. 2(a).  
 155. Id.  
 156. See infra Part V.  
 157. Felders v. Bairett, 885 F.3d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 2018) (“A ‘final decision’ is 
ordinarily one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 
but execute the judgment.’”).  
 158. See generally Gupta-Kagan supra note 104, at 23 (discussing the fact that in New 
York, delayed and incomplete agency reports are the biggest cause of delayed permanency 
hearings).  
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Thus, there are several issues with social services agencies’ court 
reports that impact the rights of parents and undoubtedly affect how each 
case unfolds. Moreover, the court’s decisions at each review hearing where 
a report is considered are not appealable; consequently, these decisions go 
unchecked by a higher court.   
V.  MINIMAL OPPORTUNITY FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
In child welfare cases, the appellate system functions as a safeguard 
that ensures that the parent-child relationship is not unfairly terminated. It 
forces the parties and the courts to follow statutes, rules, and policies, and 
provides an independent check to correct any mistakes.159 Minnesota is 
one of many states that require juvenile protection hearings to apply 
traditional appellate rules.160 This means that appellate review is limited to 
final orders, which does not fit well into the system of juvenile protection 
proceedings where most of the court’s orders are not considered “final.”161 
Consequently, “many—if not most—of the decisions about the scope and 
definition of a child’s legal rights are completely shielded from appellate 
review.”162 Not only are a child’s legal rights affected but a parent’s rights 
are implicated as well.163  
A. No Appeal as of Right for an Intermediate Disposition Order  
The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure state that 
“[a]n appeal may be taken by the aggrieved person from a final order of 
the juvenile court affecting a substantial right of the aggrieved person, 
including but not limited to an order adjudicating a child to be in need of 
protection or services, neglected and in foster care.”164 The rule seemingly 
contemplates that there are orders beyond an order adjudicating a child in 
need of protection or services that may be appealed as of right. 
 
 159. VIVEK S. SANKARAN, GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CHILD 
WELFARE APPELLATE GUIDE 1 (2013), https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/
Resources/Documents/Publications/CWS/ChildWelfareAppellateGuide.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/TH2W-KH6C]. 
 160. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.01 (“[A]ppeals of juvenile protection matters shall be 
in accordance with the Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure.”); LeVezu, supra note 7, at 2. 
 161. LeVezu, supra note 7, at 6–7; accord Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 29.  
 162. LeVezu, supra note 7, at 7. 
 163. Id. at 2.  
 164. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1.  
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Nonetheless, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has determined that 
intermediate-disposition-hearing orders are categorically not appealable.165   
In In re Welfare of the Child of E.G. and K.G., Sr., Parents,166 
appellants E.G. and K.G., Sr. appealed an intermediate dispositional 
order in the CHIPS matter concerning their two children.167 Child One 
had previously been removed from the home and placed in foster care, 
while Child Two was allowed to remain in the home.168 However, the 
county later filed an emergency motion to remove Child Two from the 
home, and after a hearing on December 1, 2015, the court ordered Child 
Two to be placed in foster care.169 At a dispositional review hearing on 
December 17, 2015, after the removal of the second child, the court 
ordered that both children remain in foster care, that the county 
determine whether the children’s grandparents could be foster-care 
licensed, and that the parents receive supervised visitation.170 The parents 
appealed both orders.171  
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that an intermediate 
dispositional order in a CHIPS matter is not appealable as a matter of 
right.172 The court noted that in juvenile-protection proceedings, the 
interim dispositional orders, which grant legal custody to the responsible 
social services agency, are subject to district court review every ninety 
days.173 In its holding, the court asserted, “The district court’s intermediate 
dispositional orders prior to the permanency hearing do not determine a 
substantial right of [parents] and, therefore, are not appealable as a matter 
of right under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 47.02, subd. 1.”174 Because the orders 
did not determine the final placement of the children, the court reasoned 
that they were not “final” orders under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile 
Protection Procedure175 and therefore, were not appealable as of right.176 
 
 165. In re Child of E.G. and K.G., Sr., 876 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).  
 166. Id.   
 167. Id. at 873. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 873–74.  
 171. Id. at 874.  
 172. Id. at 874–75. 
 173. Id. at 874 (citing MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 41.06, subdiv. 1).  
 174. Id. at 875.  
 175. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1.  
 176. In re Child of E.G. and K.G., Sr., 876 N.W.2d at 874; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 
104, at 29.   
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B. Reasonable Efforts Go Unchecked  
As noted previously, one of the functions of the appellate system is to 
ensure that the court and the parties follow statutes, rules, and agency 
policies.177 In the case of reasonable efforts, which a court must determine 
at each intermediate disposition hearing,178 the court’s finding is nearly 
always in favor of the agency179 and goes unchecked by higher courts 
throughout the proceedings.180  
Of course, the reasonable efforts of the agency may be checked after 
the final termination order, as was the case in In re Welfare of the 
Children of A.R.B.181 In that case, the district court terminated the father’s 
parental rights after finding that he failed to complete a case plan to 
correct conditions that led to his son’s out-of-home placement.182 However, 
the county never actually developed a case plan for the father to complete, 
and the evidence showed that the county never attempted to explore any 
reunification services for the father during his period of incarceration.183 
On appeal, the father argued that the county failed to provide reasonable 
rehabilitative efforts to reunify him with his son.184 Specifically, he argued 
that the court must reverse the district court’s order terminating his 
parental rights because the county had not prepared a written case plan 
that outlined the necessary steps he needed to take to reunite with his 
son.185  
The court found that section 260C.212 of the Minnesota Statutes was 
unambiguous.186 The statute mandates that a case plan be prepared and 
that it include all necessary components outlined in the statute, including 
reasons for placement of the child in foster care, a description of the 
problems or conditions that led to the out-of-home placement, and the 
changes the parent must make for the child to safely return home.187 
Because the county never provided the father with a written case plan, the 
 
 177. See infra Part V.  
 178. MINN. STAT. § 260C.201, subdiv. 2 (2016) (stating that any order for disposition 
must set forth in writing whether reasonable efforts to finalize the permanent plan for the 
child were made, including reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent or 
guardian).  
 179. See supra note 136.  
 180. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 27.  
 181. 906 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).  
 182. Id. at 896.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 897.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
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court reversed the termination of the father’s parental rights and 
remanded the case to the district court to allow the county to prepare a 
case plan with the father and provide him with an opportunity to complete 
it.188 
This case illustrates the importance of appellate review in child-
protection proceedings, as well as its pivotal role in enforcing the rights of 
parents who find themselves in the system. However, this case also 
illustrates that reasonable efforts go unchecked until the final order. This 
means that children remain in foster care—as D.T.R.’s child did—while 
their parents navigate a system that is, at times, indifferent to their rights 
and not held accountable for inaction.189 Had the county’s efforts been 
checked earlier in the process, the outcome may have been different. 
Additionally, as noted previously, one of the goals of the system is to 
achieve timely reunification for families.190 When reasonable efforts go 
unchecked until the end of the proceedings, parents do not have their 
rights enforced, families spend more time in the system, and children 
spend more time in foster care. Not only do reasonable efforts by the 
agency go unchecked, but emergency removals also go unchecked.   
C. Emergency Protective Care Orders Goes Unchecked  
In Minnesota, the court must hold an emergency removal hearing 
within seventy-two hours of the time the child was removed from her 
parents to determine whether the child should continue in custody.191 At 
that hearing, the child may be released to the parents if the court 
determines that the child’s health or welfare is not immediately 
endangered.192 Alternatively, if the court concludes that the child’s health 
or welfare will be immediately endangered in the care of the parent, then 
“the court shall order the child into foster care under the legal 
responsibility of the responsible social services agency.”193 The court must 
 
 188. Id. at 900.  
 189. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 27 (“When such decisions cannot be 
appealed until the end of a case—when an adoption decree or termination of parental rights 
decision is entered—appellate judges face strong incentives to avoid close examination of 
reasonable efforts decisions. Overturning a permanency decision based on the lack of 
reasonable efforts earlier in the case could ‘upset stability for a child who has been 
previously neglected or abused. In such circumstances, courts may find it earlier to rule that 
reasonable efforts need only mean meager or pro-forma efforts.’”).  
 190. See supra Section IV.A.  
 191. MINN. STAT. § 260C.178, subdiv. 1(a) (2016). 
 192. Id. at subdiv. 1(b).  
 193. Id. at subdiv. 1(c).  
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issue a written order within three days of the conclusion of the emergency 
protective care (EPC) hearing.194  
There is no language in the emergency protective care rule or statute 
that indicates that an EPC order may be appealed.195 Furthermore, similar 
to an intermediate disposition order, the emergency protective order is 
reviewable by the court and is, therefore, likely not considered a “final” 
appealable order under current Minnesota law.196 For instance, the court 
may schedule a formal review hearing concerning continued protective 
care at the request of a party or the county attorney.197 At the conclusion of 
the review hearing, the court can either return the child home, continue 
the child in protective care, or release the child with conditions to assure 
the child’s safety.198 Accordingly, because the court has a mechanism for 
review by way of motion of any party, and the EPC rule and statute do not 
contain language indicating that the order is appealable, an effort to appeal 
an EPC order would likely be rejected.199   
Notably, while the EPC order may not be considered a “final” order, 
it undoubtedly affects “a substantial right” of the parent. An EPC order 
effectively, even if only temporarily, ends a parent’s fundamental right to 
the “care, custody, and control” of his or her children.200 However, the rule 
reads, “An appeal may be taken by the aggrieved person from a final order 
of the juvenile court affecting a substantial right of the aggrieved person . . . 
.”201 The rule’s implied conjunctive nature does not allow a court to 
consider separately whether the order is final or whether it affects a 
 
 194. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.10.  
 195. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.178 (2016); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30; Natalie Netzel, 
Educ. and Advocacy Dir., Inst. for Children, Families, and Cmtyss., Mitchell Hamline Sch. 
of Law & John R. Rodenberg, Assoc. Judge at the Minn. Court of Appeals, Presentation at 
the Mitchell Hamline Sch. of Law Child Protection Symposium: Planning for Change in 
Minn.: How to Improve Our Removal Process (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 196. See MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1; accord In re Child of E.G. and 
K.G., Sr., 876 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016); In re Welfare of Child of B.G. 
and B.C., A16-1512, 2017 WL 958476, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.13, 2017) (“In this 
case, the EPC order was not an appealable final order affecting substantial rights.”) (citing 
In re Welfare of E.G., 876 N.W.2d at 873–74); In re Welfare of E.G., 876 N.W.2d at 
874. 
 197. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.11, subdiv. 3(a)–(b).  
 198. Id. at subdiv. 3(d)(1)–(2).  
 199. Netzel et al., supra note 195; In re Welfare of Child of B.G. and B.C., 2017 WL 
958476, at *4.  
 200. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000). 
 201. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1.  
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substantial right of the parent. Instead, an order is only appealable where it 
is final and affects a substantial right of a parent.202  
As noted previously,203 this is significant within the context of this 
rule’s application and because of the unique nature of child-protection 
proceedings.204 The ongoing nature of the proceedings means that 
substantial rights of parents are repeatedly reviewed, and decisions 
regarding these substantial rights are made each step of the way.205 The lack 
of appellate review of these decisions means that many, if not all of them, 
will go unchecked by a higher court.206  
D. Other Issues with the Emergency Protective Care Process 
Besides the fact that emergency protective care determinations likely 
are not appealable, there are other issues with the EPC process that must 
be addressed. For example, the court must advise all parties and 
participants of their rights at the EPC hearing.207 Specifically, the court 
must advise the parties of their right “to present evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses regarding whether the child should return home with or 
without conditions or whether the child should be placed in protective 
care.”208 This provision seems to afford procedural due process209 to all 
 
 202. Id.  
 203. See supra Part V.  
 204. See LeVezu, supra note 7, at 2 (“In the realm of state trial courts, child abuse and 
neglect (dependency) proceedings are unique. A traditional court case starts with a list of 
grievances by one party and ends with a settlement or trial resolving those grievances on the 
merits. However, the dependency proceedings that accompany a child’s entry into foster 
care are different. Dependency proceedings place courts in the position of not only 
determining an ultimate result, but of overseeing the ongoing actions of a state agency . . . . 
The grievances in a dependency proceeding are ever-changing as the child grows and her 
needs and circumstances change.”).  
 205. Id. at 8.  
 206. Id.  
 207. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.05.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) 
(including in the elements of a fair hearing: an unbiased tribunal, notice of the proposed 
action and the grounds asserted for it, an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed 
action should not be taken, the right to present evidence (including the right to call 
witnesses, the right to know opposing evidence, the right to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses), a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented, opportunity to be 
represented by counsel, requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence 
presented, and requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons 
for its decision).  
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parties, but in practice, only the county attorney is able to present evidence 
and cross-examine witnesses.  
Parents are first advised of their rights “[a]t the beginning of the 
emergency protective care hearing.”210 This means that parents may not be 
aware that they have the right to present a defense until they walk into the 
courtroom. Nor are they given adequate time or means to prepare their 
defense before the hearing. In contrast, the county enters the hearing 
presumably armed with a report that will act as evidence as to why the 
child should remain in protective care. This lack of time for the parent to 
meaningfully prepare is coupled with that fact that the parent may not be 
represented by counsel.211 While their right to introduce evidence or cross-
examine witnesses does not disappear simply because they are 
unrepresented, a parent’s likelihood of successfully combating the county’s 
allegations through the presentation of their own evidence or through 
effective cross-examination is slim without the assistance of counsel.212 
Even where counsel is appointed, the lawyer probably will be a public 
defender who, given large caseloads, lacks the time to prepare a 
meaningful defense to the county’s allegations, as they have likely just been 
introduced to the client and the case.  
Finally, the court has broad discretion to admit “any evidence . . .  
that is relevant to the decision of whether to continue protective care of the 
child or return the child home.”213 This includes “reliable hearsay” and 
“opinion evidence.”214 While this may allow a parent who is not 
represented and not well-versed in the rules of evidence to present a 
defense, it also means that a parent’s fundamental right to the care and 
control of her child is halted based, at times, only on hearsay and the 
opinions of others, rather than facts backed by reliable evidence.215 
 
 210. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.05.  
 211. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 3(a) (2016).  
 212. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“The right to be 
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard 
by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in 
the science of law . . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defense, even though he may have a perfect one . . . . He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”).  
 213. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.06.  
 214. Id.  
 215. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer 
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just 
determination.”).  
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VI.  TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS  
A. Involuntary Termination and Presumption of Palpable Unfitness  
Under Minnesota law, a parent “is presumed . . . palpably unfit to be 
a party to the parent and child relationship upon a showing that the 
parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily 
terminated or that the parent’s custodial rights to another child have been 
involuntarily transferred to a relative.”216 As an initial matter, parents who 
invoke their right to a trial in the face of termination or transfer of custody 
run the risk of being labeled “palpably unfit.” However, parents who 
voluntarily relinquish their right to the control and custody of their child, 
without holding the state to its burden of proving unfitness by clear and 
convincing evidence, will not be deemed palpably unfit.217 Beyond the fact 
that a parent who holds the state to its burden runs the risk of being 
classified as palpably unfit, there are other issues with the statutory 
presumption. 
When a parent’s rights have previously been terminated, the county’s 
duty to provide reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the 
family is relieved.218 The presumption is seemingly meant to protect the 
best interests of children by expediting the termination of parental rights 
and quickly establishing permanency for children.219 As noted in In re 
Welfare of Child of R.D.L. and J.W., Parents,220 “[t]he statutory 
presumption directly serves the compelling government interest of 
protecting children because it facilitates the more expeditious resolution of 
cases involving children in need of protection. The principle that child 
protection cases are to receive priority and be resolved quickly is a 
thoroughly engrained policy . . . .”221 Although well intentioned, this 
presumption undermines parental rights and due process protections.  
 
 216. MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(4) (2016). 
 217. See id.  
 218. MINN. STAT. § 260.012 (a)(2), (4) (2016); In re P.T. and A.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 
592 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the elimination of the requirements of reasonable 
efforts in cases where there has previously been an involuntary termination does not violate 
the Minnesota Constitution).  
 219. Vivek S. Sankaran, Child Welfare’s Scarlet Letter: How A Prior Termination of 
Parental Rights can Permanently Brand a Parent as Unfit, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 685, 692 (2017). 
 220. 853 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 2014) (establishing that the statutory presumption in 
Minnesota Statute §260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Minnesota or United States Constitutions).  
 221. Id. at 134.  
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Vivek Sankaran explains, “[l]awyers challenging the constitutionality 
of prior TPR statutes have relied upon Stanley to frame their 
arguments.”222 In Stanley v. Illinois,223 under Illinois law, unwed fathers 
were presumed incapable of caring for their children.224 When the mother 
of Stanley’s children died, his children became state wards without the 
state proving that Stanley was unfit to parent.225 The Illinois Supreme 
Court ultimately held that as a matter of due process, Stanley was entitled 
to a hearing on his fitness before his children we taken from him.226 The 
court reasoned:  
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than 
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure 
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, 
when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past 
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the 
important interests of both parent and child.227 
The court further asserted the state “insists on presuming rather than 
proving Stanley’s unfitness solely because it is more convenient to 
presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is 
insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is 
the dismemberment of his family.”228  
The presumption under Minnesota law can be distinguished from the 
presumption in Stanley v. Illinois. The Minnesota presumption applies to 
parents who have previously been proven unfit to parent and had their 
parental rights involuntarily terminated,229 rather than simply applying to all 
unwed parents, regardless of their fitness as parents.230 However, that does 
not eliminate the dangers associated with operating under a presumption. 
Specifically, as the Supreme Court noted in Stanley, the presumption 
“forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care” and 
“needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both 
parent and child.”231 Despite the apparent contradiction between the 
holding in Stanley v. Illinois and the statutory presumption under 
Minnesota law, the presumption remains.  
 
 222. Sankaran, supra note 219, at 696.  
 223. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
 224. Id. at 647.  
 225. Id. at 646.  
 226. Id. at 649.  
 227. Id. at 656–57.  
 228. Id. at 658.  
 229. MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(4) (2016). 
 230. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646–47.  
 231. Id. at 657.  
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1. Challenging the Presumption in Minnesota  
Despite challenges to it, the presumption remains in Minnesota. In 
In re Child of P.T. and A.T.,232 appellant-parents challenged the 
involuntary termination of their parental rights to their fifth child after their 
rights to their other four children had previously been involuntarily 
terminated.233 On appeal, appellants argued, among other things, that the 
statutory presumption of unfitness found in section 260C.301, subdivision 
1(b)(4), of the Minnesota Statutes violated appellants’ procedural and 
substantive due process rights under both the United States Constitution 
and the Minnesota Constitution.234  
In its procedural due process analysis, the court noted that due 
process in parental termination proceedings “embodies the notion of 
fundamental fairness.”235 The court went on to assert that “[f]undamental 
fairness guarantees a parent facing termination proceedings a right to a 
meaningful adversarial hearing.”236 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
because appellants were afforded an adversarial proceeding, the 
presumption in section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) did not deny 
procedural due process to parents.237 
Similarly, in its substantive due process analysis, the court concluded 
that the statutory presumption does not violate parents’ substantive due 
process right to raise their children.238 The court reasoned that the state has 
a compelling interest in protecting children from abuse by their parents 
and that the statute is narrowly tailored to meet the state’s compelling 
interest.239 The court asserted that a “parent who has had his or her 
parental rights involuntarily terminated has been adjudicated as posing a 
threat to the child now and into the future.”240 This view is precisely what 
worried the Supreme Court in Stanley: the notion that a parent who has 
 
 232. 657 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 233. Id. at 580.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Id. at 587 (citing In re Welfare of J.W., 391 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1986)). 
 236. Id. at 587–88.   
 237. Id. at 588.  
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. (citing In re Welfare of S.Z, 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996)); see 
generally Sankaran, supra note 219, at 698 (using Minnesota’s case as an example of when 
courts “simply state[] that a prior TPR is evidence of a parent’s continuing and permanent 
unfitness, an argument that contravenes the system’s recognition that an individual’s guilt 
cannot be defined solely based on prior findings.”).  
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had her rights terminated poses a threat to children now and in the 
future.241 
In applying a presumption that a parent is palpably unfit, the court is 
determining that because a parent was unfit at one time, she will always be 
unfit.242 When courts and child-welfare agencies presume that a parent is 
unfit simply because she or he may have been at one time, they ignore the 
fact that people grow and change over time.243 This, in turn, suggests a 
belief that efforts to rehabilitate are futile.244 This view undermines the 
entire child protection system, which is intended to focus on the 
rehabilitation of parents and reunification of families. 
Thus, a parent who has had his or her rights involuntarily terminated 
is classified as unfit, and any future parent-child relationship may be 
terminated.245 So, while the parent may be afforded a trial regarding fitness 
to parent, it typically occurs after the children have already been removed 
from the parent’s care, regardless of whether or not the parent is currently 
fit.246 Parents are then tasked with overcoming the statutory presumption 
that they are unfit to parent.  
2. Case Study: The Presumption in Kansas247 
While Kansas did not invalidate the statutory presumption entirely, 
the Kansas Supreme Court did invalidate the presumption as it pertained 
to In re Interest of J.L. and D.L.248 The court’s reasoning offers further 
insight into the deficiency of a statutory presumption such as the one the 
court confronted in the case and the one found in Minnesota.  
 
 241. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972); see Sankaran, supra note 219, at 
698 (“The reasoning in these cases flatly contradicts Stanley, which barred courts from 
relying on irrebuttable presumptions to find a parent to be currently unfit based solely on 
past conduct.”).  
 242. Sankaran, supra note 219, at 699.  
 243. Id. (citing In re Gach, 889 N.W.2d 707 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016)).  
 244. Id.  
 245. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(4).  
 246. See In re Child of J.A.K. and J.M.S., Parents, 907 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2018).  
 247. In his article, Child Welfare’s Scarlet Letter: How a Prior Termination of 
Parental Rights can Permanently Brand a Parent as Unfit, author Vivek Sankaran briefly 
summarizes the court’s findings in In re J.L. as an example of courts that have invalidated 
prior TPR statutes. Mr. Sankaran’s article provides a more thorough analysis and highlights 
the issues with the statutory presumption found in Minnesota law. See Sankaran, supra 
note 219, at 697–98. 
 248. See In re J.L. and D.L., 20 Kan. App. 2d 665 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).  
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In In re Interest of J.L. and D.L.,249 a mother had had her parental 
rights to two children terminated by court order.250 When the mother had 
another child eight years later, the state sought termination of her parental 
rights to that child.251 Operating under a Kansas statute that contained a 
presumption of unfitness where a parent had a previous termination, the 
state simply offered proof of the prior termination as evidence of the 
mother’s unfitness.252 The mother was then burdened with rebutting that 
presumption.253 Despite the mother’s efforts, the trial court found that she 
had failed to rebut the presumption and terminated her parental rights 
once again.254  
On appeal, the court questioned whether the mother’s procedural 
due process rights were violated.255 To answer that question, the court 
looked to Mathews v. Eldridge and applied the Mathews test.256 In 
analyzing the case, the court first looked at the private interests affected by 
the government’s action.257 Here, the private interest was the parent’s right 
to the custody and control of her child.258 The court reasoned that “other 
than the right to personal freedom, there may be no private right valued 
more highly or protected more zealously by the courts than the right of a 
parent to the custody and control of his or her children.”259 Accordingly, 
the court concluded that the private rights affected were “very significant” 
and “entitled to the highest protection.”260  
The second factor the court analyzed under the Mathews test was the 
risk of error from the procedures employed and the value of different 
procedural safeguards.261 The court weighed the risk of error in using the 
“uncontrolled presumption of unfitness versus the standard procedure of 
 
 249. Id.  
 250. Id. at 666.  
 251. Id. at 666–67. 
 252. Id. (citing K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 38-1585) (“[I]f the state establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that: (1) A parent has previously been found to be an unfit parent in 
proceedings . . . (b) The burden of proof is on the parent to rebut the presumption. In the 
absence of proof that the parent is presently fit . . . the court shall now terminate the 
parent’s parental rights . . . .”).   
 253. Id. at 667.  
 254. Id. at 668. 
 255. Id. at 669. 
 256. Id.; see supra Section II.B.  
 257. In re J.L. and D.L., 20 Kan. App. 2d at 671. 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id.  
 260. Id.  
 261. Id.   
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requiring the State to prove that unfitness.”262 The court ultimately 
determined that the risk of error in using the presumption (as applied in 
this case) was too high.263 The court noted that allowing the state to 
terminate a parent’s rights, based on documentation of an eight-year-old 
termination, was simply too easy a task for the government and that there 
was “no good reason to excuse the government from the task of proving 
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.”264 
Perhaps most significant is the court’s comparison between the 
resources available to the state and the resources available to the parent. 
The court found that the parent is always operating at a disadvantage in 
terms of resources and that applying the statutory presumption of unfitness 
only magnifies this disadvantage.265 The court concluded, “The net result is 
an unacceptable risk that a parent judged unfit many years ago will 
erroneously be adjudged unfit today for no other reason than a 
presumption based on the result in a case which has become irrelevant.”266  
More importantly, the court’s reasoning on this issue cannot be 
limited to cases where the prior termination was eight years old. Parents, 
regardless of the age of the prior termination, nearly always operate at a 
disadvantage in this system. This is especially true when parents must 
prove their current fitness while the state merely needs to present evidence 
of a prior termination to dissolve the parent-child relationship. On this 
issue, the court analogized, stating that: 
The State may not deprive a citizen of liberty by doing nothing 
more than filing proof of a prior conviction. The State may, 
however, terminate parental rights by doing nothing more than 
filing proof of a prior termination. Once this is done, parental 
rights will be terminated unless the unfortunate parent can 
convince the trial court that he or she is no longer unfit . . . that 
burden is shifted from the State with all its resources to a parent 
who has little, if any, resources in comparison.267  
Ultimately, the court determined that to remedy this disadvantage, at 
least in this case, the state must be required to prove its case without the 
benefit of the presumption.268 This adjustment would not only reduce the 
risk of error, but also would readjust resources available to the parties and 
ensure that parental rights cannot be terminated without clear and 
 
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 672.  
 264. Id.  
 265. Id.  
266.Id.  at 672–73 (emphasis added).  
 267. Id. at 674.  
 268. Id.  
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convincing evidence of the parent’s current unfitness.269 Again, while the 
court intended to apply this procedure to the case at hand, this remedy 
would undoubtedly improve procedural protections for parents in all 
subsequent termination cases.  
Finally, as to the last Mathews factor, the court found that the state’s 
power to protect children would not be hindered by eliminating the 
presumption, as it does not place an unreasonable burden on the 
government. The court determined that the loss suffered by a parent 
“greatly outweighs the government’s interest in a summary adjudication.”270  
As noted previously, the court did not find the statute itself 
unconstitutional;271 rather, it found the statutory presumption 
unconstitutional as applied to the case at hand.272 Despite the court’s 
determination that the statute itself was constitutional, the court’s 
application of the Mathews test identified procedural issues that must be 
considered in any case that uses presumptions.  
3. Minnesota’s Approach to the Statutory Presumption 
Minnesota’s approach to statutory presumption challenges is 
considerably different from Kansas’ approach and has been, in general, 
less protective of parents’ rights until recently. Minnesota courts generally 
have held where the presumption of unfitness applies, district courts need 
not establish independent reasons for a subsequent termination of parental 
rights.273 The court must base its decision to terminate parental rights on 
the conditions at the time of the termination and “it must appear that the 
conditions giving rise to the termination will continue for a prolonged, 
indeterminate period.”274 Therefore, it is the parent’s burden to establish 
that she or he is a fit parent.275  
Furthermore, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has asserted, “[w]hen 
the presumption of unfitness applies, a parent must affirmatively and 
 
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. at 675.  
 271. Id. at 676–77 (stating that a statute must be presumed constitutional and that the 
court’s duty is to construe the statute in a manner that renders it constitutional).   
 272. Id. at 676.  
 273. In re J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); In re 
D.L.R.D., a.k.a. D.L.R.H., 656 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); but see In re 
R.D.L. and J.W., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014) (stating that termination based solely 
on a statutory presumption is improper and that courts must also find that the termination 
is in the child’s best interests).  
 274. In re J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting In re P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 
543 (Minn. 2001)).  
 275. In re D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d at 250. 
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actively demonstrate her or his ability to successfully parent a child.”276 
This means that the parent has to do more than simply engage in services; 
rather, the parent must “demonstrate that his or her parenting abilities 
have improved.”277 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has acknowledged 
that this is an “onerous task” and that it requires parents and their counsel 
to “marshal any available community resources to develop a plan and 
accomplish results that demonstrate the parent’s fitness.”278 The court of 
appeals also has recognized that parents must accomplish this task in light 
of the fact that the county is relieved of its burden to provide reasonable 
efforts where the presumption applies.279  However, despite this 
recognition, the court has not acknowledged, as the Kansas court did, that 
allowing the presumption to operate in the child-welfare system puts 
parents at a further disadvantage.280 That disadvantage results in the 
“unacceptable risk” that a parent will erroneously be judged unfit.281  
4. Rebutting the Statutory Presumption in Minnesota  
In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the parent’s burden 
in rebutting the presumption and, in doing so, offered parents more 
procedural protection by lowering the standard of proof required to rebut 
the presumption. The court concluded, “the presumption is easily 
rebuttable.”282 This is contrary to the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ prior 
determinations that the parent must “affirmatively and actively 
demonstrate her or his ability to successfully parent a child.”283 Yet, under 
strict scrutiny analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned, “the 
burden imposed by the presumption cannot be a heavy one.”284  
In early 2018, in In re Child of J.A.K. and J.M.S., Parents,285 
appellant-mother challenged the district court’s finding that she failed to 
rebut the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness.286 The mother 
 
 276. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).  
 277. In re J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting In re Child of D.L.D., 771 
N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)).  
 278. Id. 
 279. In re D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d at 251.  
 280. In re J.L. and D.L., 20 Kan. App. 2d 665, 672–73 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
 281. Id. 
 282. In re Child of R.D.L. and J.W., Parents, 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014).  
 283. In re D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d at 251. 
 284. In re R.D.L. and J.W., 853 N.W.2d at 137; see also In re Child of J.A.K. and 
J.M.S., Parents, 907 N.W.2d 241, 248 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).  
 285. 907 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).  
 286. Id. at 244–45.  
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previously had her parental rights terminated after a three-day trial.287 After 
the case was tried, but before the court issued its decision, the mother gave 
birth to another child, K.J.K.288 The child was immediately placed in foster 
care and the county petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights.289 
After a two-day trial, the district court terminated the mother’s parental 
rights to K.J.K., finding that she had failed to rebut the statutory 
presumption of palpable unfitness.290 On appeal, the mother argued that 
the district court erred when it terminated her parental rights on the basis 
that she failed to rebut the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness.291  
The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that contrary to the district 
court’s finding that the mother failed to rebut the presumption, the record 
demonstrated that the mother introduced “considerable evidence that is 
inconsistent with the statutory presumption.”292 Among other things, the 
court noted that the mother had seen a psychiatrist and was now taking 
medication for her depression and personality disorder.293 She had been 
sober for more than a year and had maintained consistent employment for 
two years.294 She also was going to move into a two--bedroom apartment in 
the near future.295 Further, the mother had completed a parenting 
assessment, had regularly attended supervised visits with her child, and the 
family therapist assigned to the case had noted that the mother was 
attentive to the child’s needs and demonstrated that she was a “really 
skilled mom.”296  
Using the lower standard of proof established by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in R.D.L., the court of appeals concluded that the mother 
had presented evidence that was sufficient to rebut the statutory 
presumption.297 Accordingly, the court concluded that the presumption 
“shall have no further role”298 in the case and that the burden shifted to the 
 
 287. Id. at 244.  
 288. Id.  
 289. Id.  
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. at 244–45.  
 292. Id. at 246.  
 293. Id.  
 294. Id.  
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. at 246–47.  
 297. Id. at 247.  
 298. Id. (quoting In re Child of J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d 441, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2011)). 
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county to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother was, in 
fact, unfit.299 
Since 2015, Minnesota courts have begun to clarify and refine the law 
regarding the statutory presumption. These cases illustrate not only the 
importance of parental representation, but also the significance of 
appellate review in this arena. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court hear more cases, parents may begin to enjoy 
enhanced due process protections for their fundamental rights. 
VII. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD? 
The paramount concern in all child protection proceedings is the 
“best interests of the child.”300 While the child’s interests and safety should 
be the focus in these proceedings, courts cannot lose sight of the parents’ 
substantive and procedural rights. There are several issues that arise in 
child protection proceedings that force a collision between a parent’s rights 
and the child’s best interests. For instance, this issue arises in cases of 
extrajudicial removal of the child from the parent’s care.301 Another more 
recently explored example is where a parent wishes to call the child to 
testify in permanency proceedings.  
Under Minnesota law, parents are “entitled to be heard” and entitled 
“to present evidence material to the case.”302 Often, the child at the center 
of the proceedings has essential information that is highly relevant to the 
court’s decision regarding permanency. Yet, requiring the child to testify 
may not be in the child’s best interests, as testifying in open court might 
not only be anxiety-provoking for a young child, but may also re-
traumatize the child. However, under subdivision 6 of section 260C.163 of 
the Minnesota Statutes, the “court may, on its own motion or the motion 
of any party, take the testimony of a child witness informally when it is in 
the child’s best interests to do so.”303 Section 260C.163, however, does not 
include language allowing a court to exclude the child’s testimony 
altogether.304 Despite there being a method outlined in Minnesota law to 
take the testimony of a child informally and no language allowing a court 
to exclude a child’s testimony, there are two recent unpublished opinions 
where the Minnesota Court of Appeals had to determine whether a district 
 
 299. In re Child of J.A.K. and J.M.S., 907 N.W.2d 241, 247–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2018).  
 300. MINN. STAT. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2.  
 301. See supra Part III.  
 302. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 8.  
 303. Id. at subdiv. 6.  
 304. See id.  
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court could exclude a child’s testimony entirely.305 These two cases shed 
light on this important issue and also examined the conflict between the 
child’s interests and the parent’s rights. 
A. In re Welfare of the Child of G.G., Parent 
In In re G.G.,306 the appellant attempted to call her minor child to 
testify on her behalf; however, the child’s attorney moved the court to 
exclude the child’s testimony. The guardian ad litem, respondent father, 
and the county agency joined that motion.307 Appellant argued that the 
district court erred when it excluded the testimony of her minor child 
because the court did not have discretion to do so under subdivisions 6–7 
of section 260C.163.308 Subdivision 6 provides the district court with the 
discretion to take testimony of a child informally when it is in the child’s 
best interest to do so.309 Subdivision 7 allows the court to waive the 
presence of the child at any stage of the proceeding when it is in the child’s 
best interest to do so.310 Specifically, appellant argued that when reading 
subdivisions 6 and 7 together, it is clear that “the legislature allows courts 
to waive the presence of a minor in court, but that it cannot exclude the 
testimony altogether. Thus, when it is not in the child’s best interest to 
testify in open court, the legislature has provided another option: informal 
testimony.”311 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that it need not decide 
whether subdivisions 6–7 of section 260C.163 allow a court to exclude a 
child’s testimony because the court’s decision not to allow the child to 
testify was not prejudicial error.312 Notably, the court asserted, “there is no 
doubt that prohibiting a minor child from testifying may affect the 
substantive rights of a parent and the child.”313 The court also expressed 
“grave concern” with such exclusions in the future.314 So, while the court of 
appeals expressed concern over future exclusions of a minor’s testimony, 
 
 305. See In re Child of Q.S.M. and T.R.S., A18-0662, 2018 WL 5915447, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018); In re Child of G.G., A18-0788, 2018 WL 5780446, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2018).  
 306. In re G.G., 2018 WL 5780446, at *1. 
 307. Id. at *2.  
 308. Id.  
 309. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 6. 
 310. Id. at subdiv. 7.   
 311. In re G.G., 2018 WL 5780446, at *2.  
 312. Id. at *6.  
 313. Id. at *6 n.1. 
 314. Id.  
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this decision nonetheless seemed to allow a district court to exclude such 
testimony in contravention of the clearly proscribed alternative method 
outlined in subdivision 6 of section 260C.163. Such an exclusion 
undoubtedly implicates a parent’s constitutional right to “fundamentally 
fair procedures”315 since it denies the parent the right to present all relevant 
evidence to the court. In an opinion issued one week later, a different 
three--judge panel addressed the same issue.  
B. In re Welfare of the Child of Q.S.M., and T.R.S., Parents  
In re Child of Q.S.M. and T.R.S explored the issue in greater 
detail.316 Similar to In re G.G., the parent, in this case, attempted to call 
her child to testify, but the district court, on the county’s motion, excluded 
the child’s testimony without making any written or oral findings.317 Each 
judge on the three-judge panel concluded that the district court erred in 
precluding the minor’s testimony. Each judge, however, offered different 
reasoning for this conclusion.318 Most relevant here are the concurrences 
by Judge Ross and Judge Johnson.  
In his concurrence, Judge Ross asserted that even if the statute in 
question gave the district court the authority to exclude a child’s testimony, 
“the district court may never apply that authority in a manner that fails to 
give full account of a person’s fundamental, constitutionally protected right 
to present relevant evidence in a case that threatens to terminate that 
person’s parental rights to her children.”319 Accordingly, Judge Ross opined 
that a parent has the right to present relevant evidence unless the court 
finds that the risks to the child in testifying are greater than the interest in 
maintaining the parent-child relationship.320 
Similarly, Judge Johnson determined that the district court did not 
have authority under chapter 260C to exclude the testimony of a child 
who is the subject of the petition.321 Judge Johnson’s concurrence 
expressed concern about interpreting the statutory best-interest policy 
broadly, explaining that such an interpretation would “unjustifiably limit or 
negate procedural rights” of parents.322 Moreover, he concluded that the 
 
 315. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).  
 316. In re Child of Q.S.M. and T.R.S., A18-0662, 2018 WL 5915447, at *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018). 
 317. Id. at *11.  
 318. See id.  
 319. Id. at CS-1 (Ross, J., concurring).  
 320. Id. at CS-2.  
 321. Id. at CS-1 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 322. Id. at CS-3. 
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court must interpret the statute in a manner that preserves its 
constitutionality.323 As such, he advised the court to interpret the provisions 
of section 260C.163 “in a manner that would avoid any infringement on a 
parent’s constitutional rights.”324  
Whether a parent has the right to call a minor child who is the 
subject of the petition to testify is an unresolved question that implicates 
both the constitutional rights of parents and the statutory rights of children. 
This important issue demonstrates the tension between a parent’s rights to 
“fundamentally fair procedures” and a child’s best interests, while also 
illustrating a somewhat new acknowledgment by Minnesota courts that a 
child’s best interests may, at times, have to yield to the parent’s 
constitutionally protected rights.  
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s View of the Conflict Between 
Parents’ Rights and the Child’s Best Interests  
The issue of whether parents have the right to call a minor child to 
testify on their behalf has not come before the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
However, other issues that involve the conflict between a parent’s rights 
and the best interests of the child have been addressed. A recent case 
provides insight into the court’s current view of this tension and how it 
should be resolved. Thus, this case may give attorneys who want to bring 
such issues before the supreme court an indication of how the court may 
rule on such issues. 
In re Welfare of Child of R.K.325 involved a father’s appeal of an 
order terminating his parental rights. The court of appeals dismissed the 
father’s appeal of the order as untimely and the supreme court granted the 
father’s petition for review to determine whether the appeal was, in fact, 
untimely under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure.326 
While the issue primarily revolved around interpreting provisions of the 
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure regarding appellate 
procedures,327 intimately intertwined with that issue was a conflict between 
a parent’s due process rights and the child’s best interests.  
The majority found that a “plain-language interpretation [of the rule] 
[was] sufficient to resolve the case”328 and that permanency would not be 
significantly delayed by allowing the father’s appeal to proceed since the 
 
 323. Id.  
 324. Id.  
 325. 901 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. 2017).  
 326. Id. at 159.  
 327. Id.  
 328. Id. at 160.  
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difference in the appeal period would be only three days.329 The majority 
further asserted that expeditious resolutions to permanency are required, 
so as to not allow children to “linger in uncertainty,” but “[t]he ‘just, 
thorough, speedy, and efficient’ resolution of permanency also requires 
that [the court] ‘ensure due process for all persons involved in the 
proceedings.’”330 Specifically, the majority noted that permitting the father 
to rely on mail service, rather than electronic service, to calculate his 
appeal deadline “is consistent with the due process he is owed.”331 
Accordingly, the court remanded to the court of appeals with instructions 
to reinstate the father’s appeal.332 This decision came with a sharp dissent 
by Chief Justice Gildea, joined by Justice McKeig.  
Chief Justice Gildea addressed the interpretation of the rules 
governing appeals and clarified that the interpretation must occur within 
the context and through the lens of the larger issue: the best interests of 
the child.333 She opened her dissent with a look at the goal of the 
Children’s Justice Initiative, which directs the court “to look to the best 
interests of the child at every step of [the] process.”334 She further asserted 
that the majority undermined that goal of the Children’s Justice Initiative. 
By relying on the “general principle that procedural rules are construed to 
preserve the right to an appeal,” the majority disregarded the “overarching 
objective” of juvenile protection matters, which is to make “an expedient 
determination of permanency.”335 Accordingly, Chief Justice Gildea would 
find, based “most importantly” on the best interests of the child, that the 
father’s appeal was untimely.336   
It comes as no surprise that this tension between the child’s best 
interests and a parent’s rights produced a divided court. There are no easy 
answers in situations where a child’s health, safety, and well-being are 
pitted against a parent’s constitutionally protected rights. Despite the 
paramount importance of serving “the best interests of the child,” courts 
must be careful not to blindly pursue this objective and ignore the parent’s 
due process rights in the process.337  
 
 329. Id. at 162.  
 330. Id. (quoting MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 1.02(f)).  
 331. Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982)).  
 332. Id. at 163.  
 333. See id. (Gildea, J., dissenting).  
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 165.  
 336. Id.  
 337. MINN. STAT. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Parents have both a substantive due process right to raise their 
children and a procedural due process right to be afforded fundamentally 
fair procedures when the state attempts to terminate the substantive right. 
While elements of Minnesota law afford parents the procedural due 
process to which they are entitled, other aspects are seriously lacking. 
Several procedures under Minnesota law create barriers to fundamental 
fairness for parents. They start when children are first removed from the 
home and continue throughout the duration of the proceedings. Due to 
the statutory presumption of unfitness, parents are confronted with these 
procedural barriers even after a termination order has been entered. 
Despite Minnesota’s strides in recent years, parents remain disadvantaged 
in child protection proceedings.  
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